1996issue C101-8
Seasonality and presidential election cycle regimes
The election-year cycle is a market-regime overlay, not a standalone forecast. Each seasonal window still has to be crossed with its cycle-year label before an entry, exit, or cash-park rule is accepted as one testable procedure.
- In the 1950-1995 monthly S&P 500 close-to-close sample, average monthly returns were 0.12% in postelection years, 0.46% in midterm years, 1.50% in preelection years, and 0.84% in election years, against an unsplit monthly average of 0.74%.
- Year-scale rise-frequency was uneven: the index never closed down for a full preelection year, rose in 91% of election years, and closed higher in only 45% of postelection years and 55% of midterm years.
- An illustrative system that held the index only in preelection and election years and used cash-park in 90-day Treasury cash in the other two years reached 733605 from a 1950 stake of 10000, versus 372388 for buy-and-hold, with a maximum annual loss of -18.7% versus -41.3%.
- Crossing month-of-year with cycle year reordered the months, and none of the six strongest four-year-cycle months came from postelection years.
A four-year regime overlay
The election-year cycle is the four-year political calendar that labels each year as postelection, midterm, preelection, or election. A cycle-year label from 1 through 4 lets a spreadsheet split monthly index returns by that political year.
Editorial: treat those labels as a market-regime overlay. The overlay still has to be crossed with monthly seasonality before any entry, exit, or cash-park rule is accepted as one testable procedure.
The unsplit monthly baseline
Over the 1950-1995 monthly S&P 500 close-to-close sample, the average month gained 0.74%, the index rose in 57% of months, the average annual gain was 9%, and 71% of years closed higher. Dividends were excluded. Those figures are the baseline before any cycle-year split.
Returns and rise-frequency by cycle year
When the same months were split by cycle year, average monthly returns were 0.12% in postelection years, 0.46% in midterm years, 1.50% in preelection years, and 0.84% in election years.
Average annual returns in that sample were 2.00% in postelection years and 4.63% in midterm years, versus 18.72% in preelection years and 10.08% in election years.
Rise-frequency at the year scale was uneven. The index never closed down for a full preelection year from 1950 to 1995, rose in 91% of election years, and closed higher in only 45% of postelection years and 55% of midterm years.
An illustrative system, not a plan
An illustrative system held the index only in preelection and election years and used cash-park in 90-day Treasury cash in the other two years. That regime-aware allocation turned a 1950 stake of 10000 into 733605 by 1995, versus 372388 for buy-and-hold, with a maximum annual loss of -18.7% versus -41.3%.
The reverse allocation, long only in postelection and midterm years, grew 10000 only to 56297 over the same span, with a 3.9% average annual return. That path was worse than an all-cash 90-day Treasury path that grew 10000 to 110905.
Editorial: this is an illustrative system used only to test a relationship, not a complete money-management plan. A risk-adjusted-return comparison would still reduce average annual return by a penalty based on monthly variability before the same procedure is accepted.
A regime label can change drawdown
Several large historical declines, including 1962, 1973-74, and 1982, clustered in postelection or midterm years. That is why a cycle-year filter can change both return and drawdown when it is treated as a regime label rather than a standalone forecast.
Seasonal windows inside the cycle
A seasonal window is a calendar month whose typical return and rise-frequency are measured inside a named year of the cycle, not across all years at once. Crossing month-of-year with cycle year changed the ranking of individual months.
January was weak mainly in midterm years and strongest in preelection years. May was useful mainly in postelection years. June was poor in the first two cycle years and strong in the last two. July averaged more than 1% in every cycle year. September was weak except in election years. October was dangerous in preelection years but otherwise solid.
Editorial: a combined-calendar filter marks a month as tradable only when both its seasonal rank and its cycle-year label support exposure.
The six-month list and the midterm-October start
If only six months in the four-year cycle could be held, the ranked list was preelection January at 5.38%, preelection December at 3.35%, preelection April at 3.27%, midterm October at 2.51%, midterm November at 2.46%, and election-year November at 2.32%. None of those six came from postelection years.
The stronger preelection stretch was described as beginning in midterm October and fading by the end of preelection August, an 11-month window that averaged 26.7% in the sample, or 29.5% annualized. That midterm-October start is why a January 1 year box is a weaker regime cut than the same cycle-year labels applied to the seasonal windows that carried the stretch.
All readings on this track · 41 readings
- 1989Evaluating venue volume as a speculation-breadth signal
- 1991A thirty-name price-weighted average as a seasonal regime classroom
- 1991Ranked half-year rate changes as an equity signal filter
- 1991Demographic wave as a market-regime overlay
- 1994Seasonal range regimes as a futures context overlay
- 1996Evaluating presidential party terms as equity regimes
- 1996A dominant cycle is a baseline, not a reprint
- 1996Seasonality and presidential election cycle regimes
- 1997Stacking calendar regimes around election years
- 1997Calendar seasonality as a testable trading procedure
- 1997Lunar phase delay as a testable seasonal regime
- 1998Seasonal system construction without curve-fitting
- 1999Crowd life cycle as a market regime map
- 2001Regime-dependent cycle timing after four-year and seasonal lows
- 2002A 2002 case study in regime-first seasonal selection
- 2002Seasonal windows and dominant-cycle rules
- 2002Fifty-four-year wholesale cycle as an inflation-deflation regime map
- 2004The championship conference rule as a yearly regime case study
- 2004Election-year seasonality as trade regime context
- 2006Two-ten inversion as an intermarket regime filter
- 2006Midterm-to-presidential seasonal holding window
- 2008Two-layer equity regimes from seasonality and price history
- 2008Seasonal futures as a regime filter, not a calendar rule
- 2008Retesting seasonal rules when regimes change
- 2010Corn and wheat staggered calendars as dollar-neutral seasonal spreads
- 2011Name the S&P 500 trend regime before using weekly and monthly seasonality
- 2012Seasonal windows that wait for confirmation
- 2013Pair-sleeve rotation as a two-state sector regime-switch
- 2013Lunar phase as a seasonal overlay on implied volatility
- 2013Soybean seasonal highs in a five-year carryover regime
- 2014Year-end tax-loss selling as a seasonal regime
- 2017Calendar-window overlays that mute mechanical signals without rewriting the system
- 2017A four-year cycle and volume case study of a secular bear
- 2017Treat the valuation climate as climate and implied-volatility extremes as weather
- 2019Seasonal depth versus tracking for futures position sizing
- 2019Stacking cycle forecasts with seasonal regimes
- 2019Hit-rate gates for seasonal regime evaluation
- 2019July to October as a seasonal window, not a reason to own the name
- 2020A recession-regime checklist from valuation stretch and the yield curve
- 2020Treat a seasonal idea as a stay-or-sit holding procedure
- 2020A single position as a sleeve on a seasonal regime map