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1990issue C081-5

Breadth nonconfirmation as the gate for a volume fade and long-put case

After an unconfirmed-high, this archive case treats a market-breadth failure as the license for a volume-price fade. The fade is expressed as equal-sized, time-boxed long puts, and a reversal in relative-volume is both the invalidation of the fade and the exit test.

  • An unconfirmed-high is a new price extreme that market-breadth and volume measures fail to support, and that failure is the gate for the fade.
  • Volume-price-analysis then limits the hypothesis to names that have already left cycle highs and whose volume has faded faster than the broad tape.
  • The long-put is the single testable vehicle for entry, risk-spreading across names, and a time box to expiration.
  • The same relative-volume turn that would invalidate the fade is also the exit test, together with a reverse in relative-price and a volume-percentage-ratio check of a later low.
Entries in this reading3 entries

The unconfirmed-peak gate

Market-breadth, in this archive, is a participation test. Advancing versus declining issues, and related volume measures, are used to ask whether a new price high is confirmed.

Editorial: the unconfirmed-peak gate is the point of the case. A market-breadth failure at a new high is what licenses a volume-price fade as a multi-name, time-boxed long-put hypothesis. Without that gate, the fade is not treated as open.

The 1989 unconfirmed highs

After a widely unconfirmed high dated September 1, 1989, the case treated the next decline as the second down-leg that follows a modest rebound from the first drop.

On October 3, 1989 the DJIA printed a new high at 2754.56 while participation and volume measures failed to confirm that high.

Comparison with the 1978 cycle

The 1989 structure was compared with the July 5 to November 14, 1978 cycle, when an upside-volume measure and a basic volume measure weakened while prices were still advancing.

Editorial: the comparison is structural. Weakening volume while price is still advancing is the same class of nonconfirmation later used on October 3, 1989.

The October 5 trigger

The afternoon of October 5 was treated as the trigger once a higher close looked likely while declining issues outnumbered advancing issues.

Editorial: that is when the unconfirmed-high is allowed to become the fade hypothesis. Price can still be on course for a higher close, but market-breadth is already failing.

Selecting the fade names

Candidate issues were those that had already retreated from cycle highs, whose volume had faded faster than the broad tape, and whose down-day volume exceeded up-day volume.

Selection used four constructed series: a signed-volume exponential average with smoothing 0.1, a market-volume exponential average with smoothing 0.03, relative price versus the NYSE with smoothing 0.15, and relative volume versus NYSE volume with smoothing 0.03.

The signed-volume-average adds volume on up closes and subtracts it on down closes. Relative-price is a smoothed issue-versus-exchange percentage change; only the direction of the line is treated as informative. Relative-volume is the smoothed issue-versus-exchange volume comparison used to judge whether participation is fading or returning.

The long-put vehicle

On October 5 the case opened equal-sized long puts on three names, adding one metals-group name to spread single-issue risk.

Editorial: the long-put is the defined-risk vehicle that makes entry, risk-spreading, and exit one testable procedure.

Exits that reuse the fade test

Later exits followed reversing relative volume and relative price, plus a volume-percentage-ratio nonconfirmation of a DJIA low, with the last position closed when only two weeks remained until expiration.

The volume-percentage-ratio is a tape measure used to test whether a recent low in the average is confirmed by volume behavior.

Editorial: when relative-volume turns back, the fade hypothesis is already invalidated. That is why the same test closes the long-put, rather than a separate price target.

Educational research material, not investment advice. Historical source context does not establish present-day performance.
3 of 22 in the Long put track
20021-2 pp.Next on Long putVolatility-first construction for a bearish put or debitWhen names already looked inexpensive and implied volatility was judged low, the construction chosen was simply to buy 60- to 90-day puts rather than a more complex structure.
All readings on this track · 22 readings
  1. 1984A long silver put as a prepaid loss cap
  2. 1984Spectral window gates for index long puts
  3. 1990Breadth nonconfirmation as the gate for a volume fade and long-put case
  4. 2002Volatility-first construction for a bearish put or debit
  5. 2002Name the regime and the season before choosing a long put
  6. 2005Critique of put spreads versus outright long puts
  7. 2007Sector put hedges, automatic exercise, and pin risk
  8. 2008Margin shock, defined-debit options, and selective premium
  9. 2008Ranking in-the-money puts by breakeven rather than cheapest premium
  10. 2012Evaluating long-put moneyness when implied volatility shifts
  11. 2012Sizing a long butterfly for early assignment and a long option for gamma
  12. 2013Gold after the April break: option-spread vehicles and a long-put hedge
  13. 2014A defined-risk option case for the mid-February to mid-July energy window
  14. 2014Long put versus vertical debit spread on a Treasury ETF
  15. 2015Defined debit call spread on a health-insurer worksheet
  16. 2015Overbought technology index: a long put via an inverse proxy
  17. 2018Replace futures stops with short-dated long puts
  18. 2018Constructing short-dated long puts around weekly expiration
  19. 2018Four decisions before a portfolio protective put
  20. 2018Incremental producer hedging with puts and risk reversals
  21. 2019Put butterfly versus long put in a volatility spike
  22. 2020Scenario-first SPY put hedge: butterfly versus long put
All 26 readings tagged Long put
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